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A proposed legislation against the “manipulation of information” is currently under
consideration by the French parliament. It was voted by the National Assembly
and rejected by the Senate, where Emmanuel Macron’s political party does not
hold a majority. A joint committee of both chambers has been summoned in the
hope of finding an agreement. This bill aims – among other things – to create an
emergency legal remedy. During the three months before a national election, a judge
could be asked to stop within 48 hours the spread of “fake” or “false” news (fausses
informations). This tool against misinformation raises a lot of questions, including
procedural and technical ones.
I will only focus on a particular point: How do we define fake news?
Struggling for Words
The efforts made by the French parliament perfectly illustrate the difficulty of this
task, and the rather unsatisfying outcomes of these efforts result in the need to come
up with a better definition. Every attempt to regulate fake news must indeed start
from a sufficiently precise definition. The issue of fake news is more specific than the
general issue of truth in electoral campaigns. Regulating fake news is not the same
as restricting every inaccurate political statement.
The original bill contained no definition of fake news. A parliamentary commission
defined them later as the “allegation of a fact lacking any verifiable element making
it credible” (Toute allégation ou imputation d’un fait dépourvue d’éléments vérifiables
de nature à la rendre vraisemblable). This definition was dropped in plenary session
and replaced by another one, defining fake news as “any allegation of a fact that
is inaccurate or misleading” (Toute allégation ou imputation d’un fait inexacte ou
trompeuse). Furthermore, the judge shall put a halt to the spreading of such fake
news only if they are likely to “distort the fairness of the election” (de nature à
altérer la sincérité du scrutin), and if their propagation on the internet was made
“deliberately” and “in an artificial or automatized and massive way” (diffusées de
manière délibérée, de manière artificielle ou automatisée et massive). The bill is not
targeting the author of fake news but its massive propagation.
The current definition deals with the content of the speech, the consequences of
its diffusion, and the intent of its propagator. The definition might change again in
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the future, but one can build on this proposal to search for a better definition of fake
news which I will do after a scrutiny of the aforementioned elements.
From Misleading Opinions to Fake News – Content
Fact or Feeling?
Fake news are false. Every definition of fake news should clearly say so. The words
used in the parliamentary definition (inaccurate or misleading) are therefore not
the best choice. Furthermore, the conjunction “or” indicates that an accurate but
misleading statement could qualify as “false information.”
The criterion of falsity implies that fake news are factual statements. Opinions can
seem absurd or despicable, but they cannot be false. However, one should keep
in mind that an expression dressed up as an opinion can imply factual elements:
“If a speaker says, 'In my opinion John Jones is a liar,' he implies a knowledge of
facts which lead to the conclusion that Jones told an untruth. […] Simply couching
such statements in terms of opinion does not dispel these implications.”1)SCOTUS,
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, 497 U.S. 1 (1990), p. 18.
The criterion of falsity excludes satire, parody, hyperboles or similar rhetorical
devices. “For better or worse, our society has long since passed the stage at which
the use of the word 'bastard' would occasion an investigation into the target’s lineage
or the cry 'you pig' would prompt a probe for a porcine pedigree.”2)Levinsky’s v. Wal-
Mart Stores, 127 F.3d 122 (1997), p. 128. Statements of facts must be reasonably
understood as serious, referential affirmations. During the parliamentary debate,
many examples were given to show the dangers and absurdity to regulate fake
news. But most of them were not statements of facts. Here are a few of these
examples.
During the campaign about the European Constitution, French politician François
Bayrou stated that, if the “No” prevailed, it would rain during more than 40 days.
With your statute, you would ban such an expression, said a representative during
the recent debate. Another representative said at one point that “the road to hell
is paved with good intentions.” Jean-Luc Mélenchon interjected: “Fake news!” But
these expressions are metaphors, rhetorical hyperbole and the like. They are not
statements of facts and can therefore not be described as false.
Crucial or Petty?
This aspect of fake news is hard to define precisely but it is nevertheless important.
Some authors mention in this context the “materiality” of the false assertion.3)See
Clay Calvert ans Austin Winning, «Filtering Fake News Through a Lens of Supreme
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Court Observations and Adages», First Amendment Law Review, 2018, p. 158. The
falsehood shall not deal with a minor element but with a fact of sufficient importance.
The word “inexacte” in the French definition is therefore inappropriate, since it can
mean “false” but also “inaccurate.” However, this flaw might well be repaired with
another element of the bill: the diffusion of the false information must be likely to
“distort the fairness of the election” which can only be the case when the falsehood
relates to a significant fact.
Fake or False?
This extremely important point was completely ignored by the French parliament.
Every false statement of facts does not qualify as fake news, as manipulation of
information, to quote the title of the French bill. The expression must masquerade as
a real news report. In this sense it can be qualified as “fake” – and not simply “false”
– news.
This is crucial. One should not be induced in error by the proliferation of the words
“fake news” that are now used to criticize any purportedly false statement made by
anyone. Regulating fake news does not amount to restricting any inaccurate or even
plainly false statement during a campaign. Fake news imitates the style of a news
report to spread falsehoods. The statement uttered by a political candidate or written
in a campaign leaflet should not fall under a law against fake news.
For sure, giving a precise definition of the “appearance of real news” is not an easy
task. But this does not necessarily mean that this criterion is very hard to check.
News are like elephants and pornographic pictures: I cannot define it but I know it
when I see it.
Obvious or Obscure?
This is the second serious gap in the French definition. Only unequivocally false
statements can qualify as fake news, at least for the purpose of an emergency
procedure like the one contemplated by the French legislator. The parliamentary
proceedings show that the French parliament does in fact target such obvious false
statements. But this element should appear in the statute.
Of course, this element brings a serious problem with it. The judge will decline to
act against a statement that is not obviously false. Now, a statement is not true just
because it is not obviously false. But the judgment might give rise to an impression
of truth. Furthermore, proof of falseness might be hard to produce, especially when it
is “negative”. I can easily prove that I paid my income tax. But how am I to prove that
I do not own a bank account in Switzerland?
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Candidates should think twice before bringing the matter before the judge. But one
problem of the French bill is that it allows any person having an interest – which
could mean any voter – to request a judicial decision.
I leave this important matter aside, because my interest here is not on the
appropriateness to regulate fake news, but only on its definition. The second
element of the definition deals with the consequence of the expression.
The Likelihood of Consequences
The bill targets the propagation of fake news only if they are likely to “distort the
fairness of the election.” This point was strongly criticized by several representatives:
how could the judge know before the election that an expression is likely to have
such a consequence?
This criticism rests upon a misunderstanding. The judge will not have to show that
the fake news will in fact impact the vote, nor of course will they have to show that
the expression did impact a vote that has not yet occurred. The judge will have
to assess the likelihood of the consequence. It is a quite usual process in the law
governing freedom of expression, and not a very demanding one. The offence of
incitement to violence is an example. Contrary to what prevails in US law, the French
judge does not have to show a concrete and imminent risk of harm: a reasonable
likelihood is usually sufficient.
One can bet that every fake news dealing with a candidate or a topic relevant to the
campaign will be seen as satisfying this condition. As seen before, the real input of
this element is to specify the content of the message, to circumscribe the topic of the
false information.
Oops, I didn’t mean to – Intent
The bill targets the deliberate spreading of fake news likely to distort the fairness of
the election. This element of intent therefore has a double aspect. The propagator
shall know that the statement is false – or, in the current and hopefully soon to be
dropped definition, “inaccurate or misleading” –, and they shall know that its diffusion
is likely to have the dreaded consequence.
French law governing the freedom of expression shows that these conditions
will not be difficult to meet. Intent is indeed examined through the standard of
the reasonable man. If the statement is obviously false, the propagator should
reasonably be aware of it. And if the judge considers that its diffusion is reasonably
likely to affect the fairness of the election, so should the reasonable propagator.
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Shedding Light on the Target
Starting from the French bill, the definition of fake news can be refined as follow.
(Note that I remove the intentional element which plays a – relative minor – role in
the legal regime of fake news, but is not necessary to the conceptual definition.)
The obviously false statement of fact having the appearance of real news and likely
to distort the fairness of the election.
This definition can certainly be criticized, modified and improved. But one thing
is certain: a sufficiently precise definition is a necessary preliminary condition to
have a real debate on the specific issue of fake news. Without such a definition, the
legislator will merely be shooting in the dark.
So far, the debate in the French parliament has been replete with pompous
declarations on the freedom of expression, Orwellian references to the danger of a
“ministry of truth” and so on. This, however, brushes aside the real questions and the
specific problems raised by the issue of fake news.
It may be that a regulation of fake news is contrary to the French Constitution or to
the European Convention on Human Rights. Furthermore, a restriction of fake news
might be inopportune as it might raise more problems than it solves. There may
even be nothing to fear and thus no need to legislate on fake news. As someone
wrote, fake news might be a fake problem. While I did not deal with these issues
here one cannot start to think about them without a precise definition of fake news.
In the absence of a preliminary definition that sufficiently circumscribes its object,
the French parliament runs the risk of having a fake debate.4)These remarks were
presented at the conference Misinformation in Referenda, organized in August 2018
at the University of Lausanne by Sandrine Baume, Véronique Boillet and Vincent
Martenet.
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